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Judicial Deference and the Perpetuation of
Exclusionary Zoning: A Case Study,
Theoretical Overview, and Proposal
for Change
Thus you have the
wonderful vagaries of the
law review Note and
Comment; not so much old
wine in new bottles as
stale wine in new
bottles-an endless
rehashingofyesterday's
rehashing, a cosmic worm
offootnotes thatfeeds
on its own tail like
Ourobouros.*
INTRODUCTION

The United States is in the midst of a low-income housing crisis.1
An analogous shortage also existed in the Town of Brookhaven during
the time period relevant to the major case discussed in this comment,
Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven.2 Despite this reality,
New York courts are still upholding the exclusion of low-income housing
through municipal implementation of zoning ordinances. Exclusion is accomplished by the use of a plan which creates severe economic impediments to the construction of low-income housing. In Suffolk Housing,
the Court of Appeals refused to find any municipal obligation to foster
low-income housing or, at least, to remove the legally sanctioned impediments that make the construction of low-income housing by private developers economically infeasible.
This comment contends that judicial deference to legislative deci*

Boyle, Dumping: (Colon) on Law Reviews, CLS, May 1987, at 18.

1. See generally Dolbeare, The Low-income Housing Crisis, in A

RADICAL PERSPECTIVE ON
THE HOUSING CRISIS 29-75 (C. Hartman ed.). Dolbeare bases her thesis on the deficit of dwelling

units available at the federally recognized figure of 30% of income for individuals living near or
below the poverty line.
2. 70 N.Y. 2d 122, 511 N.E.2d 67, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1987).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

sion-making in the area of zoning often leads to unjust results. Governmental bodies hide behind the curtain of rationality review to perpetuate
the exclusion of low-income housing. This comment argues that judicial
deference to legislative decision-making in the zoning context is often
undesirable because the presumption of constitutionality was designed to
protect against a particular historical evil-the specter of an unelected
judiciary preventing legislatures from deviating from a priori notions of
lassiez-faire capitalism. When the presumption of constitutionality is
viewed in its proper historical perspective, the minimum level of rationality ordinarily required to justify social and economic legislation often becomes suspect, especially when the legislation works to distort the
machinations of existing markets to the disadvantage of already disempowered groups. This comment argues for the establishment of a middle-ground between complete deference and judicial legislation.
The routine immunization of legislation from any meaningful level
of judical scrutiny is acutely felt by low-income individuals. When laws
are contrary to their interests, the poor are urged to seek redress through
the political process. In the context of our present political system, these
appeals are often unheard or unheeded. The thesis of this comment is
that the unique economic, political, and theoretical position of the poor
in our society warrants heightened judicial scrutiny of legislation which
has the effect of altering economic markets, such as housing, to the unnecessary detriment of the poor. While this comment ackowledges that
the issue of whether a municipality has any affirmative obligation to promote low-income housing is important, this issue is beyond the scope of
this piece.
To demonstrate how the presumption of constitutionality works in
practice, this comment sets forth the facts and holding of a particular
case, Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven.3 Section II argues
that the town's discretionary implementation of its zoning amendment
process makes the construction of low-income housing unnecessarily expensive, risky to the developer, and unlikely.4 In its holding, the New
York Court of Appeals stated that the town's assertion that general economic circumstances causing the lack of low-income housing constituted
a sufficient rebuttal of the appellant's claims, given the strong presumption of constitutionality which attaches to legislation such as zoning ordinances.' As applied by the court, the presumption acts as an umbrella
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 103-109 and accompanying text.
5. 70 N.Y.2d 122, 130, 511 N.E.2d 67, 70-71, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924, 926 (1987).
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which protects the ordinance from the unwanted "hard rain" of meaningful judicial scrutiny.
Section II proposes that, if the goal of judicial review is to assure the
existence of "public values" in legislation, there is little reason to legitimate the exclusion of low-income housing in an area already experiencing an acute shortage of such housing. Here, this comment notes recent
criticisms of the presumption which question the validity of the premise
that all political actors have equal access to the political process. This
criticism suggests that, since the poor are systematically unable to maintain an effective political voice, heightened judicial scrutiny would not be
as undemocratic as is commonly thought.
Section IV is devoted to demonstrating the unique historical-theoretical posture of the poor in American political society and re-examining
the civic republican notion that property is necessary for meaningful
political participation. This comment argues that the task of modem theorists is to recover this heritage and realize that wealth is an important
enough political consideration to be taken into account in the context of
judicial review. As presently constructed, the doctrine of formal equality
prevents substantive access at the political level and heightened scrutiny
on the judicial level.
Section V argues that, after a realistic assessment of the above,
heightened judicial scrutiny should be applied to laws which unfairly
deny the poor access to the housing market. This comment proposes that
when laws of this type are challenged, the courts should apply a preponderance of evidence standard, modeled after the "substantially related to
an important government interest" test of Craig v. Boren.6 This standard
promotes the twin goals of preventing the exclusion of low-income housing and maintaining flexibility in local land use policy. Laws which have
only a marginal impact on low-income housing would not be invalidated.
This piece is not a casenote in that it is not exclusively concerned
with the doctrine enunciated in a particular case. Instead, it is an attempt
to illustrate some of the drawbacks of applying the rationality standard
to certain zoning laws. This comment does not claim to be exhaustive or
definitive; it simply tries to explore the problem and suggest a alternate
approach. This comment's point is narrow. The issue of whether government has any substantive constitutional obligation to foster the development of low-income housing is not directly addressed. Instead, this
comment argues that legislation which distorts the housing market to the
6.

429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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economic disadvantage of low-income individuals as a group should be
closely scrutinized to ensure that it promotes a public purpose. In other
words, the legislation must be examined to ensure that it does not act to
exclude low-income housing from a particular jurisdiction.
II.

CASESTUDY: SUFFOLK HOUSING SER VICES V TOWN OF
BR OOKHA VEN

A. Background
Before addressing the case itself, a little background is in order. As
recently as 1985, an article entitled, "Stage is Set in N.Y. for Attack on
Exclusionary Zoning,"' appeared in the New York Law Journal. The
author noted:
In spite of New York's more traditional approach to the question of the
impact of zoning ordinances on housing opportunities, the Mt. Laurel decisions are stimulating increased pressure on New York's courts to react in a
less deferential manner to the traditional presumptive authority of a municipality to formulate its own land use policies. While Appellate courts in
New York have declined to require that municipalities provide opportunites
for housing of low-income individuals, the stage has been set in New York
for an attack on zoning laws and restrictions which do not provide for the
accomodation of housing for.. .low-income
8 individuals or which displace
such people in favor of the more wealthy.
In the same year, for the first time, a New York court held that New
Jersey's Mt. Laurel doctrine,9 which requires municipalities to affirmatively foster the development of low-income housing, was also the law of
New York. 0 The above, along with the Court of Appeals's decision to
hear Suffolk Housing Services embodied the hope of the progressive zoning community that New York's approach to exclusionary zoning and
low-income housing was about to change.
B.

The Facts and Claim

In Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven," resident lowincome persons, taxpayers and public interest organizations sought judicial rezoning of the entire town by the New York Court of Appeals. The
7. Rice, Stage isSet In New York for Attack on Exclusionary Zoning, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 20, 1985,
at 34, col. 1. See also Rice, Zoning and Land Use, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 750, 750-55 (1986).
8. Rice, supra note 7 at 34.

9. See infra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
10. Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch, 129 Misc.2d 67, 492 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. County
Sup. Ct. 1985). See also infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
11. 70 N.Y.2d 122, 511 N.E.2d 67, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1987).

1988/89]

EXCL USIONAR Y ZONING

case arose in 1975 when appellants first brought suit against the town.
Appellants claimed that the town was inhibiting the construction of lowincome housing in violation of, inter alia, Town Law sections 261 and
263,12 which require that towns use their zoning power to promote the
general welfare, and the Federal Fair Housing Act. 13 The case was tried
in 1980,'1 and in 1982, Judge Gerard ruled upholding the validity of the
ordinance. In 1985, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the
5
trial court.'
The town of Brookhaven is the largest township in New York State.
It occupies more than 340 square miles and as of 1979 had an estimated
population of 354,000.6 By 1973, 58% of the town's available land had
been developed.' 7 The trial court concluded that the town was experiencing a severe shortage of low-income housing."i The town required an
additional 7242 units, of which 74% would normally consist of rental
units. 9 A large portion of the housing occupied by low-income persons
was deemed by the trial court to be in a deteriorated condition.2 0

The town's multi-family housing policy consists of pre-mapping all
available land for single family dwellings."z In order to gain permission
12. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 261, 263 (McKinney 1989). Section 261 enables towns governments to
regulate land use and lists allowable purposes for land use regulation:
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and
designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire, flood, panic and
other dangers; to promote health and general welfare; to provide adequate light and air;
to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to
make provisions for, so far as conditions permit, the acccomodation of solar energy systems and equipment and access to sunlight necessary therfore; to facilitate the adequate
provision of transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks and other public requirements.
Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, as to
the character of the district and its particular suitability for particular uses, and with a
view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of
land throughout the community.
N.Y. ToWN LAW at § 263 (1989).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 3601. The Court of Appeals did not address the fair housing claim although it
was raised by the appellants.
14. Unreported.
15. Suffolk Housing Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d. 323, 491 N.Y.S. 396 (2d Dep't

1985)
16. Record at 893, Suffolk Housing, 109 AD.2d 323.
17. Record at 1103-04, 1536-37.
18. Id. at 27.
19. Id. at 490.
20. Id. at 1249.
21. Id. at 1088. The Town's zoning policy is still in effect as of the publication date. Permission
may also be granted to cluster multi-family housing at densities no higher than what would be
allowed in the existing single-family zone. N.Y. TOWN LAW at § 281.
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to build multi-family housing at densities higher than those allowed
under the single family classifications, a developer must acquire a site of
at least 50 acres2" and apply for a zoning amendment to one of two

multi-family classifications (MF-1 and MF-2).1 3 The zoning amendment
process is purely discretionary;24 it is quite unlike a special permit which

allows an otherwise prohibited use if statutorily defined criteria are
met.z5 The process is admittedly slow, risky to the developer, and usually

unsuccessful. Prior to a decision by the zoning board, the planned development must be submitted to public hearings which inevitably subject
the developer to "vehement public opposition."2 6
From 1971-77, only 12.8% of all application for MF-1 or MF-2
rezonings were approved.2 7 From 1972-1980, only six multi-family devel-

opments were approved.

8

When rezonings were granted, developers

were often required to agree to the imposition of covenants which re-

stricted 80% of the units to one-bedroom or efficiency and 20% to twobedrooms.2 9 In cases where no covenant was written into the rezoning,

developers often informally agreed to similar conditions. 30 The town's
discretionary rezoning process resulted in almost exclusive development
of single-family homes marketed as condominiums. In some instances,
the town also required covenants prohibiting rental units or oral agree31
ments to the same effect.

The trial court also established that the ubiquitous single-family
22. Suffolk Housing Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 333, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396, 404
(2d Dep't 1985).
23. Defendant's Ex. F.
24. Record at 783; CODE OF THE TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN §§ 85, 105-133.
25. A special exception or permit is:
a use permitted by the ordinancein a district in which it is not necessarily incompatible,
but where it might cause harm if not watched. Exceptions are authorized under conditions which will insure their compatibility with the surrounding uses. Typically, a land
use which is the subject of a special exception demands a large amount of land, may be
public or semi-public in character and might be obnoxious or offensive. Not all of these
characteristics will apply to every executed use, however. Hospitals in residential districts are one example, because of potential traffic and other problems which may affect a
residential neighborhood. A filling station in a light commercial district is another example because of its potentially noxious effects.
Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning, 1963 WAsH.U.L.Q. 60, 62-63 (1963).
26. Suffolk Housing Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 129, 511 N.E.2d 68, 69, 517
N.Y.S.2d 924, 925 (1987).
27. Record at 1180, Suffolk Housing, 70 N.Y. 2d 122.
28. Record at 1179-80.
29. Id. at 714-15.
30. Id. at 730.
31. Id. at 1819-30, 2420-21; Defendant's Ex. F; Plaintiff's Ex. Nos. 75, 81.
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home was too expensive for the town's low-income population. 32 From
1975-1980, Brookhaven failed to build a single subsidized family unit.33
There is no public housing authority. However, the town has shown little
reluctance to allowing the development of subsidized rental units for the
elderly.3 4
C. New York's Exclusionary Zoning Case Law
Before the New York Court of Appeals, appellants conceded that
the town's zoning ordinance was invulnerable to facial attack because it
theoretically allowed for multi-family housing as required under Berenson v. Town of New Castle.35 In Berenson, the Court of Appeals held that
the town of New Castle's zoning ordinance, which prohibited multi-family housing, violated the general welfare clause of the New York's zoning
enabling clause.3 6 The court established a two-part test for determining
the validity of a zoning ordinance. First, "a primary goal of a zoning
ordinance must be to provide for a balanced, cohesive community which
will make efficient use of the town's available land.",37 A total ban on
apartments is unacceptable under the first prong of the test. However,
though "it may be impermissable in an undeveloped community to prevent entirely the construction of multiple family units anywhere in the
locality[,] it is perfectly acceptable to limit construction of such buildings
where such units already exist."' 38 The second part of the test requires the
community to consider regional housing needs in addition to local
needs. 39 No obligation to allow additional multi-family dwellings will be
found if other communities in the region are meeting that particular
need. 4°
In Blitz v. Town of New Castle,41 the Second Department of the Appellate Division attempted to clarify some of the issues left open in Berenson. In addressing the issue of whether municipalities have any
32. Record at 1476-77; Plaintiff's Ex. No. 66.
33. Record at 1222.
99
34. Id. at 640, 671, 916-18; Plaintiff's Ex. No. 6 p. .
35. 38 N.Y.2d. 102, 341 N.E.2d. 236, 378 N.Y.S. 672 (1975).
36. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 261, 263 (McKinney 1989).
37. 38 N.Y.2d at 109-111, 341 N.E.2d at 241-43, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 679-81.
38. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680 (citations omitted).

39. Id.
40. Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681. In the context of the Berenson case, the
court noted: "[I]f New Castle's neighbors supply enough multiple dwelling units or land to build
such units to satisfy New Castle's need, as well as their own, there would be no obligation on New
Castle's part to supply more, assuming there is no overriding regional need." Id.
41. 94 A.D.2d 92, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832 (2d Dep't 1983).
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affirmative obligation to provide for a complete array of housing, the
court stated, "New York courts have consistently rejected any 'fair
share' doctrine which would impose specific unit goals or quotas of housing on a municipality."'4 2 Instead of looking at numerical goals, the court
decided that an examination of "relevant data which may indicate
whether New Castle's provision for housing is at all commensurate with
some general notion of its expected contribution to regional housing
needs" was appropriate.4 3 The county legislature's adoption of a blue ribbon panel's recommendation of the area's regional housing need was held
to be valid.'
In addressing plaintiff's contention that part two of the Berenson
test would only be satisfied by accounting for housing that would, or
probably would, be built, the court answered:
[Z]oning ordinances will go no farther than determining what may or may
not be built; market forces will decide what will actually be built .... [O]ur
concern is to determine whether, on its face, the amended ordinance will
allow the construction of sufficient housing to meet the town's share of the
region's housing needs, particularly for multifamily housing, assuming that
such construction be both physically and economicallyfeasible.4"
In North Shore Unitarian Universalist Society v. Village of Upper
Brookville,4 6 the Second Department further refined the regional needs
prong of the Berenson test. There, plaintiffs challenged a local ordinance
prohibiting the construction of multi-unit senior citizen housing. In assessing regional need for this type of housing, the court noted a NassauSuffolk Comprehensive Developoment Plan which concluded that the regional supply of such housing was adequate.4 7 The court also pointed to
the fact that preserving the town's open space helped to satisfy regional
48
needs for undisturbed land and for water preservation.
However, in the same year, Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch
was decided.4 9 The case revolved around the City of New York's creation
of a special development district in Chinatown, where developers could
build at higher that otherwise allowed densities in exchange for the construction of certain public amenities, such as swimming pools, "subsi42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 98, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 98, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
Id. at 99, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836 (emphasis in original).
110 A.D. 123, 493 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2d Dept. 1985).
Id. at 127, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
Id.
129 Misc.2d 67, 492 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 1985).
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dized units for low- and moderate-income families and the rehabilitation
of existing structures."5 ° In this particular case, the developer was able to
build an 87 unit condominium priced at $170,000-500,000 per unit."1 In
exchange for permission to build at a higher density, the developer
agreed to include a public swimming pool in the design of the building
and to contribute $500,000 towards the construction and rehabilitation
of low-income housing within the affected district. 2
Plaintiffs contended that granting the permit failed to implement a
"well balanced plan" as required under Berenson and the Equal Protection Clause of the New York State Constitution 3 because it failed to
"provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of low-income housing." 54 In other words, the granting of the permit was characterized as a
part of a larger gentrification plan designed to exclude low-income individuals from the Chinatown district. 5 In rejecting the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court stated that the plaintiffs had asserted a valid
claim because it interpreted New York law to require an affirmative obligation to foster low-income housing. Justice Saxe noted, " in light of the
needs of the Chinatown community, a well balanced plan may be held to
consist of a plan which facilitates the construction of quality low-income
housing." 5 6 The issue of whether the zoning amendment accomplished
this purpose was left for resolution at trial. 7
D. Appellant's Claim in Suffolk Housing
In Suffolk Housing, because the Town of Brookhaven made some
allowances for multi-family housing, the appellants were forced to challenge the implementation of the ordinance. The court construed the case
as consisting of a single issue: whether the plaintiffs had carried their
burden of proof in establishing that the Town had intentionally caused
the alleged lack of low-income housing, given the strong presumption of
constitutionality which attaches to zoning ordinances.
50. Id. at 73, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 841-42.
51. Id. at 74, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
52. Id.
53. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
54. Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch, 129 Misc.2d 67, 76, 492 N.Y.S.2d 837, 842 (New
York County Sup. Ct. 1985).
55. Id. at 79-80, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
56. Id. at 88, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
57. Id. Note, however, that Judge Saxe's decision was overturned. 128 A.D.2d 99, 514 N.Y.S.2d
939 (Ist Dep't 1987), aff'd 72 N.Y.2d 121, 527 N.E.2d 265, 531 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1988).
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1. Mt. Laurel in New York? Appellants, while confining their case
to the implementation of the ordinance, contended that Berenson imposed substantive obligations on the Town of Brookhaven. Posing South
Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel5 8 (Mt. Laurel I) as a
model, appellants insisted that Berenson required municipalities to affirmatively promote the development of low-income housing. While
couching their case in established legalities, appellants urged the New
York Court of Appeals to adopt the substantive due process and equal
protection analysis of the New Jersey Supreme Court.
In Mt. Laurel I, plaintiffs, resident and non-resident low-income
persons, taxpayers and the NAACP, sought to overturn the township's
zoning ordinance. The ordinance, despite an abundance of undeveloped
land, prohibited the development of any multi-family housing. The court
held that exclusion of this type violated the New Jersey Constitution
even without a showing of discriminatory intent.5 9 In a marked departure from any previous case, Judge Hall, writing for the majority, stated
that developing municipalities must meet "their fair share of the present
and prospective regional needs" for low-income housing.60 The court
found the "fair share" obligation in the substantive due process and equal
6
protection clauses of the New Jersey constitution. 1
As a result of the township's intransigence in complying with Mt.
Laurel I, plaintiffs were forced to bring suit in South Burlington NAACP
v. Township of Mt. Laurel (Mt. Laurel I1).61 In the years 1975-1983, the
township set aside only one-quarter of one per cent of its undeveloped
land for multi-family housing. Not suprisingly, not one unit was constructed. 3 As a result of the township's actions, the Mt. Laurel II court
stated: "Papered with studies, rationalized by hired experts, the ordinance is true to nothing but Mt. Laurel's determination to exclude the
poor." 6
To force compliance with its Mt. Laurel I mandate, the New Jersey
Supreme Court required that municipalities affirmatively promote lowincome housing through remedial measures. First, a developer who succeeds in her Mt. Laurel suit is afforded the so-called "builder's remedy."
Simply stated, the builder's remedy allows the builder to actually con58. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
59. Id. at 185, 336 A.2d at 730.
60. Id. at 159, 336 A.2d at 725.
61. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1,1I.
62. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
63. Id. at 179, 456 A.2d, at 428.
64. Id. at 198, 456 A.2d, at 410.
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struct the project, in addition to having the ordinance at issue declared
invalid.6" Other remedial measures might include density bonuses which
allow construction at higher densities than are normally allowed if the
developer agrees to include a specified number of low-income units.
Under certain conditions, developers can be legally required to build lowincome units in otherwise market-priced developments.6 6 To ensure compliance with the dictates of Mt. Laurel I, three special judgeships were
established.6 7
E.

The Holding

Referring to the affirmed findings of fact of the lower courts, Chief
Justice Wachtler, writing for the majority in Suffolk Housing Services v.
Town of Brookhaven, alluded to the approval of "numerous developer
applications" for the construction of multi-family housing. 68 The Appellate Division found that during the relevant time, 36 multi-family
projects were approved by the Town Board. 6 9 The Court of Appeals concurred with the lower court's determination that these 36 approvals constituted a sufficient rebuttal of the appellant's contention that the town
unfairly inhibited the construction of low-income housing, given the
strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to legislation of this
kind. The lack of developers willing to undertake such projects due to
65. Id. at 279-81, 456 A.2d at 452-53. The builder's remedy has been defined as "a form of
redress by which a builder-plaintiff in exclusionary zoning litigation is compensated for damages
suffered as as result of the invalid ordinance by permitting him to proceed with his proposed development subject to certain conditions." Rose, New Additions to the Lexicon of Exclusionary Zoning
Litigation, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 851, 870 (1984).
66. 92 N.J. at 261-74, 456 A.2d at 442-50.
67. Id. at 216, 456 A.2d, at 419. However, in 1986, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the
New Jersey Fair Housing Act. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 52:27D-301 (West 1988); Hills Development Co.
v. Township of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986). Briefly stated, the Fair Housing Act
withdrew oversight of Mt. Laurel compliance from the 3-judge panel empowered under Mt. Laurel
II, and turned the task over to an admimistrative agency. The agency was given "the power to define
housing regions within the state and the regional need for low and moderate income housing, along
with the power to promulgate criteria and guidelines to enable municiplities within each region to
determine their fair share of regional needs." The agency is also empowered to determine if municipal actions satisfy its Mt. Laurel obligations. Id. at 48-49, 510 A.2d at 646-47; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 57:27D-316 (West 1988). The act also places a moratorium on the builder's remedy. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:27D-328 (West 1988).
The court's approval of the act has been criticized as a "bailout" because it returns the process to
the very municipalities that were being sued for failure to live up to their obligations. See Lipman,
The FairHousing Act?, 9 S.H. LEGIs. J. 569 (1986).
68. Suffolk, 70 N.Y.2d at 130, 511 N.E.2d at 69, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
69. Suffolk Housing Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 329, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396, 401
(2d Dep't 1985).
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factors such as rising construction costs and economic stagnation,
claimed the court, "contributed significantly to the inadequate development [of low-income housing]." 70
The failure to grant relief was further justified by the court's characterization of the appellant's proposed rezoning of the 49,100 acres of vacant land in the town of Brookhaven as "radical. ' 7 1 Citing Kurzius, Inc.
v. Village of Upper Brookville,72 the court stated, "[z]oning is an essentially legislative task, it is therefore anomalous that courts should be required to perform the tasks of a regional planner. ' 73 The Appellant's
failure to point to the denial of a request to develop a particular project,
claimed Justice Wachter, created a unattractive claim for judicial intervention.74 In the same vein, the court insisted that the institutional claimants' lack of personal housing needs plus the inability of these groups to
locate individual plaintiffs "underscores the abstract character of the
case." 75 In sum, the court denied that anyone would be without housing
as a result of its decision.
F.

The StandingIssue

The court's references to the nature of appellant's claim and demand
of relief present an interesting paradox. On appeal, the town contended
that the Court of Appeals should reject the lower court's liberal views on
standing and dismiss the complaint. 76 Though not directly addressing the
issue, the court implicitly granted standing to the plaintiffs. However, the
court's ambivalence to the appellant's standing is clear from its characterization of the claim as "abstract. '77 The effect this tacit grant of standing will have on future cases is not entirely clear. In Asian Americans for
Equality v. Koch, the Court of Appeals cited Suffolk Housing Services for
the proposition that "plaintiffs [who] alleged either that they live in substandard housing [in the district affected by the zoning amendment] or
that they were compelled to leave because of their inability to find suitable housing... [and who] are persons of low income and none own prop70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
versy"

Suffolk, 70 N.Y.2d at 130, 511 N.E.2d at 70, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
Id.
51 N.Y.2d 338, 414 N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980).
Id. at 347, 414 N.E.2d at 682, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
Suffolk, 70 N.Y.2d at 131, 511 N.E.2d at 71, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
Id.
Suffolk, 70 N.Y.2d, at 124 (points of counsel).
The New York State Constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, has no "case or controrequirement.
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erty in Chinatown" had standing in the case.78 The court acknowledged
that this holding was contrary to federal standing law as exemplified by
Warth v. Seldin79 and proceeded to dispose of the claim on the merits.
1. Rejection of Warth v. Seldin Zoning on the Merits. In Warth,
plaintiffs sought to set aside the Town of Penfield's zoning ordinance
which restricted almost all available residential land to single family
housing. In refusing to grant standing to the plaintiffs, the Supreme
Court held in Warth that there must be "specific, concrete facts demonstrating" harm to the plaintiff and that "he would personally benefit from
the court's intervention." 8 ° The importance of "an initial focus on... a
particular project" was noted in a footnote.8 a In assessing the plaintiff's
situation, the Court emphasized the need for a "causal relationship" between their injuries and the zoning ordinance, and concluded that no
"substantial probability" of such a relationship existed. Standing claims
by Rochester taxpayers and public interest organizations were dismissed
because they were characterized by the Court as attempting to assert the
constitutional rights of third parties.8 2
Ironically, although the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
disagreed on the stage at which the claim should be denied, they adopted
strikingly similar rationales in denying the request for standing and refusing to declare that the town's zoning was illegally implemented. Both
courts focused on the abstract nature of the respective claims in resolving
the cases.
2. Does Standing Really Matter? The implications of the grant of
standing remain unclear due to the unqualified rejection of the claim on
the merits. Perhaps the decision to grant standing is a result of the
court's strong desire to reject the core contention that Berenson required
any affirmative obligation to foster low-income housing. Conscious or not
of criticisms of Warth which stress that the holding forces the plaintiffs
to try the case on the merits at the standing stage,83 the Court of Appeals
has adopted a more expansive view on the subject notwithstanding the
78. 72 N.Y.2d 121, 127, 527 N.E.2d 265, 268, 531 N.Y.S.2d 782, 785 (1988).
79. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
80. Id. at 502-08.
81. Id. at 508, n.18.
82. Id. at 508-14.
83. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 520-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). "[Tihe opinion,
which tosses out of court almost every conceivable kind of plaintiff who could be injured by the
activity claimed to be unconstitutional, can only be explained by an indefensible hostility to the
merits." Id. at 520.
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lack of a "case and controversy" requirement under the New York State
Constitution. 4 Plaintiffs are given the luxury of having their claim rejected in the flame of the fire (on the merits) instead of in the heat of the
frying pan (the standing stage). Barring an unambiguous exculsionary
intent on the part of a municipality or a per se exlusion of multi-family
housing, plaintiffs have little chance prevailing. However, if the Court of

Appeals does employ a different interpretation of Berenson in the future,
similar plaintiffs will be permitted to gain standing to sue under Suffolk
Housing Services.
G.

A CriticalAnalysis of the Holding

"Implicit in our ruling is a recognition that a municipality may not
exercise its zoning power to effectuate socio-economic or racial discrimination." 5 Yet according to the affirmed finding of the Appellate Division, "the record is replete with evidence that town officials, with popular
support, made every effort to exclude low-to-moderate income hous-

ing."

6

While the holding and Berenson indicate that a municipality is

under no duty to act affirmatively to promote the development of lowincome housing, 7 the lower court's findings betray something more than
the laissez-faire attitude required by Berenson and Kurzius. 8 If the town
had presented equal opposition to housing proposed to serve minority
groups only, a court would have been hard pressed to find anything but
discrimination. Opposition to low-income housing is merely a form of
discrimination against the poor.89
84. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. A more liberal view of standing appears to be developing in New
York. In Sun-Brite Car Wash, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, the court stated, "[standing] principles, which are in the end matters of public policy, should not be heavy-handed; in zoning litigation
in particular, it is desirable that land use disputes be be resolved on their merits rather than by
preclusive, restrictive standing rules." 69 N.Y.2d 406,413, 508 N.E.2d 130,133, 515 N.Y.S.2d
418,421 (1987). See also Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch, 72 N.Y.2d 121, 527 N.E.2d 265, 531
N.Y.S.2d 782 (allowing standing for low-income plaintiffs, none of whom owned property in the area
affected by the zoning regulation).
85. Suffolk, 70 N.Y.2d at 129, 511 N.E.2d at 69, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
86. Suffolk, 109 A.D.2d. at 337-38, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
87. Suffolk, 70 N.Y.2d at 130, 511 N.E.2d at 70-71, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
88. Suffolk, 109 A.D.2d at 332, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
89. By grouping together the words 'socio-economic' and 'racial,' the court highlights the social-science evidence which indicates that the two terms are closely related. Discrimination against
the poor is often tantamount to discrimination against racial minorities. For a recent discussion of
class as the basis for Afro-American economic instability, see Wilson, American Social Policyand the
Ghetto Underclass,DISSENT, Winter 1988, at 57.
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1. Zoning as Market Interference. In the town of Brookhaven, developers willing and able to construct low-cost housing must resort to a
highly discretionary rezoning process and its concomitant public hearings.90 These hearings, according to the Court of Appeals, inevitably subject the developer to "vehement public opposition." 9 1 These procedures
and the town's affirmed opposition to low-income housing create an unequivocal impression of the socio-economic discrimination the court so
resolutely opposes. In defense of its actions, the respondent argued that
pre-mapping all available land exclusively for single-family homes was
customary practice throughout Long Island.92 In fact, 99% of the land in
the New York metropolitan area is so zoned. 93 Beyond the desire to socially exclude, the reason for the lack of land pre-mapped for multi-family housing is a fear of being a loser in a zero-sum-game.
According to this model, no municipality can afford to have a less
restrictive zoning policy than any other municipality. A municipality
that fails to restrict multi-family/low-income housing will suddenly become flooded with housing of this type. The municipalities are afraid that
a glut of new housing occupied by the poor would strain local government and school budgets to the breaking point. 94 The import of this
model is that only strong inter-jurisdictional planning can serve the interests of low-income housing.95 Without a strong state policy mandating
shared responsibility for low-income housing, regional planning as required by Berenson remains an illusory ideal. Local governments have no
incentive to act alone; to do so is considered suicidal.
The failure to pre-map any land in a large, heterogeneous township
like Brookhaven is particularly burdensome considering the difficulties a
developer must face to gain permission to construct multi-family dwellings. In Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville,96 the Court of Ap90. See supra note 26.
91. Suffolk Housing Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 129, 511 N.E.2d 68, 69, 517
N.Y.S.2d 924, 925 (1987).
92. Suffolk Housing Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 332, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396, 403
(2d Dep't 1985).
93.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 140 (1968).

94. R.BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 9 (1973). Covenants restricting the
number of bedrooms are designed to implement the same purpose. Id.
95. The conundrum of the zero-sum-game can be illustrated through the child labor controversy of the early 20th century. The statute at issue in The Child Labor Case, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)
was an attempt to nationalize the problem. Without a federal law controlling child labor, even states
not favoring child labor as a moral or social issue were forced to allow it or face cutthroat competition from the states which permitted this economical form of labor. All jurisdictions are compelled
to take the least restrictive approach lest they lose their economic base.
96. 51 N.Y.2d 338, 343, 414 N.E.2d 680, 683, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (1980).
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peals upheld the Village's zoning ordinance which only allowed for single
family homes on five acre plots. The Village of Upper Brookville was
described by the New York Court of Appeals as "a coherent area characterized by estate type development and generally bounded by properties
developed on a large lot basis."'9 7 In justifying the ordinance, the court
noted that a variety of housing types were available nearby. While the
five acre zoning was upheld, Kurzius makes clear that large lot zoning,
when enacted for an exclusionary purpose, is illegal. The court
stated,"[o]nce an exclusionary effect coupled with a failure to balance
local desires with housing needs has been proved then the burden of
otherwise justifying the ordinace shifts to the [municipality]." 98 This specialized fact situation should not justify Brookhaven's failure to pre-map
some land for multi-family development. The historical justification for
zoning is supposed to be: a place for everything, everything in its place. 99
The town of Brookhaven and the Court of Appeals have perpetuated the
validity of another maxim: the suburbs are no place for the poor. Berenson's requirement that a zoning ordinance need only allow for the theoretical possibility of multi-family housing fails to adequately account for
the welfare of Brookhaven's low-income population. Instead, it overemphasizes the maintenance of property values and the tax burden on the
current resident population.10°
2. Low-income Housing: Public or Private. When the doctrinal
smoke has blown over, the difference between the court's and the appellant's conceptions of the police power comprises a principal issue of the
case. The appellants contended that, "the use of governmental powers in
a manner offensive to the general welfare-is the same in New York as in
New Jersey." (referring to the Mt. Laurel decisions) 10 1 In its decision,
the Court of Appeals did not even mention Mt. Laurel. The differing
views of the sister states make for a stark contrast. In New York, the
construction of low-income housing is viewed as a primarily economic
issue-the result of private, market oriented transactions. In New Jersey,
on the other hand, low-income housing is portrayed as a deeply political
issue requiring collective action and responsibility.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 345, 414 N.E.2d at 683-84, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
99. S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 137-51 (1969).
100. Contrary to the way the court portrays value, its essential source is the community itself.
01. Suffolk Housing Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 125 (1987) (points of
counsel).
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3. Government as an Actor in the Housing Market. The New York
position of allowing the market to determine what type and quantity of
housing will be built in the absence of governmental subsidies is ironic on
several counts.10 2 First, the Appellate Division found that the Town's
failure to pre-map any land for multi-family housing was "at least a contributing factor" in the lack of low-cost housing. 11 3 The lack of zoning
for multi-family housing inflates the cost of development by maintaining
prices at an artificially high level. This is the inherent difficulty in most
zoning regulations. 1 4 As one commentator put it:
In California, the prices of homes have doubled, tripled, and even quadrupled within the last six years. Rents have increased at a similar pace, and in
early 1980 the vacancy rate was placed at less than one percent. Inflation
may have contributed to this phenomenon but cannot fully account for it.
The main cause is a shrinking supply of housing relative to demand. Because there are no real shortages of labor, material, or land, had market
forces been allowed to opertate without restraint, the supply of housing
would have kept up with demand. Instead, supply and demand notions
were shelved for political decisions to "manage and control growth" - euphemisms for regulations that artificially and deliberately limited the construction of housing. Given a growing demand for housing of all types, a
policy decision to limit the supply must inevitably drive prices upward. It
was predictable that price increases for homes and rentals would be correspondingly great. The most effective way of limiting the supply of housing
is to give to government a general power to control the use of land.... The
process is called zoning. Its stated purpose is regulation that would separate
incompatible land uses and protect against present and anticiapated environmental harms. But whatever its stated purpose, zoning functions too
censoriously by imposing and legitimizing prior restraints on the use of
land. As a result, genuine monopoly effects are created - less production of
housing and prices influenced upward.... Through zoning laws, government has, in fact, become the sponsor of exclusion and discrimination and
05
the instrument through which supply is curtailed and price increased.1
Moreover, resorting to the special permit procedure or rezoning
process forces developers (and eventually consumers) to absorb finance
charges accumulated on monies borrowed while awaiting the results of
102. Suffolk Housing Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D. 323, 332, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396, 402
(2d Dep't 1985).
103. Id.
104. Delogu, Local Land Use Planning:An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 36 ME. L. REv. 261,
263 (1984). In ML Laurel I, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized this reality. As a result of
zoning and other land use regulations, the price of a single-family home in New Jersey was increased
from $33,843 to $57,618. Mt. Laurel I, 92 N.J. 158, 259 n.25, 456 A.2d 390, 441-42 n. 25.
105. Karlin, Zoningand OtherLand Use Controls:From the Supply Side, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 561
(1981) (quoted in Delogu supra note 104 at 291).
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the lengthy and often unsuccessful process."0 6 Other up-front costs to
developers can include lawyer's fees, the cost of preparing petitions and
applications, neighborhood publicity, public relations campaigns, and
preliminary architectural renderings. °7 The 50 acre minimum site requirement has the additional effect of permitting only large, hence expensive to finance, developments. 10 8 These regulations and the effects which
they have on prices suggest that the very private-public distinction which
New York courts implicitly rely on is not as easily defined as might first
appear. Whether one prefers a market-oriented philosophy or a state interventionist model of land use planning, it is undeniable that by zoning
only for single family housing, the town of Brookhaven has interfered
with the machinations of the 'pure market.' The town partially creates
the housing market by regulating what type of housing is allowable and
under what conditions it can be built.
4. Insulating Exclusionary Zoning Through Judicial Deference.
Though the court concluded that general economic circumstances contributed significantly to the lack of low-income housing, closer analysis
reveals the fallacy of this reasoning. Before proceeding, however, a summary of the court's rationale is in order. First, all legislative acts are
presumed to be constitutional. Secondly, even though the facts indicate
that the town practiced a successful policy of inhibiting the construction
of low-income housing, in light of the presumption of constitutionality,
the town needed only to provide a rational, permissible reason for the
deficiency. Thirdly, the Court of Appeals found that the "economy" pro106. King, Inclusionary Zoning: Unfair Response to the Need for Low Income Housing, 4 W.
NEW. ENG. L. REv. 597, 606 (1984). According to King:
It has been postulated that land use controls frequently have the effect of excluding from
suburban communities anyone whose income is lower than that of the current residents
by maintaining housing rents at an artificially high level. Large lot low density zoning
contributes to a higher price per lot. Minimum floor requirements result in the construction of homes that are larger and more expensive than necessary to maintain minimum
health standards. Requirements that a subdivision developer provide basic improvements such as streets, sidewalks, and sewers, and even dedicate land for schools and
parks or pay a fee in lieu of doing so, increase the cost of housing and place the burden of
financing community amenities on new residents.
Id. (citations omitted).
Like all sources of regulation, zoning is commutarian in nature; it allows the government/majority to limit or control how the owner or potential owner will use her property. See also Delogu, supra
note 104 at 262-63.
107. Interview with John Crabbe, Project Director of Delta Development of Western New
York, Inc., in Buffalo, N.Y. (March 27, 1989). See also King supra note 107 at 606.
108. Suffolk Housing, 109 A.D.2d at 333, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
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vided a rational, if not compelling, reason. Thus the town carried its burden of proof and prevailed.
The result of the court's method is to completely insulate claims of
this type from meaningful judicial scrutiny. Since the economy will always be a major factor in the housing market, courts can always point to
it as a "rational, if not compelling, reason" for the lack of housing. Besides maintaining this impenetrable legal barrier, by proceeding in this
fashion, the court fails to account for the interdependence of government
and the market. In the Court of Appeal's view, two separate spheres of
human activity exist. The first sphere consists of government which
stands outside the market.
The second sphere is some sort of pure market which is not related
in any way to government. As discussed earlier, government plays an
important role in defining the parameters of the housing market through
zoning regulations. It also defines the market by creating some types of
property rights and not recognizing others, by enforcing some types of
transactions, and by choosing which kinds of interests are alienable. Government can and does make adjustments in its regulatory patterns when
the market responds adversely or acts in a socially undesirable fashion. If
the Court of Appeals is sincere in its commitment to prohibiting socioeconomic discrimination, the town of Brookhaven's role in manufacturing the lack of low-income housing is too important to be legally ignored.
Zoning regulations which directly increase the cost of doing business
produce the lack of developers willing to undertake low-income projects.
The foregoing directly implicates the presumption of constitutionality as the key procedural element preventing the court from scrutinizing
the town's exclusionary implementation of its zoning ordinance. The
town is free to carry out its policy of excluding low-income housing as
long as the economy can be cited as a contributing factor. In the opinion,
appellants are reminded that zoning is a purely legislative task. The
court's message is: seek redress through the legislative and/or electoral
processes.
III.

THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY AND POOR PEOPLE

The remainder of this comment is devoted to a critical overview of
the presumption of constitutionality. As has been argued, it acts as a
legal umbrella under which no rain can fall. Generally, the presumption
is taken for granted as necessary for the preservation of a democratic
society defined by the separation of the legislative and judicial branches
of government. This comment argues that the presumption is based on
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several false assumptions, including the idea that the legislative process is
necesarily more "democratic" than judicial intervention. Understanding
the relationship between formal equality and poor people's ability to attain effective access to the political process is also important in understanding the overbroad insulating effects of the presumption of
constitutionality.
A.

The Origin and HistoricalMeaning of Rationality Review
As this comment has argued, the town's zoning policy plays an important role in the formulation of the housing market. The failure to set
aside land for multi-family housing raises the cost of development
through the accrual of finance charges and excessive minimum site requirements. The public hearings form another obstacle designed to delay
and deter potential development. These factors were explicitly recognized by the Appellate Division Suffolk Housing. The court noted that
the town's policies "were, at least, a contributing factor to the lack of
low-cost housing." However, under rationality review, legal recognition
of this form of socio-economic discrimination is not possible. The presumption of constitutionality cuts short any meaningful review of zoning
ordinances which discriminate against the poor. Only instances of racial,109 gender," 0 and reverse"' discrimination will subject legislation to
anything more than a cursory level of scrutiny.
The presumption of constitutionality has come to be considered an
embodiment of modem rationality." 2 As differing social theories began
to compete in America, the legal community began to see decisions such
as Lochner v.New York 1 3 as wrongly decided for two primary reasons.
First, the specter of the judiciary imposing its normative theory of economics was considered undemocratic and socially counterproductive.
The inability of legislatures to rectify the unequal bargaining power of
labor and capital came to be recognized as an impediment to a stable
economy. Secondly, in light of the attack of the legal realist movement,
109. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ'n., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).

110. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
111. See, eg., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
112. Modem rationality, as described by Max Weber, would deny the existence or possibility of
a collective good. Individuals are only capable of understanding their own interests. M. WEBER,
SCIENCE AS A VOCATION 152-53 (1923).
113. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (The Court struck down a statute designed to
limit bakers to working an 8 hour day. The liberty of the workers to freely contract for more than
the maximum was held to be violated by the statute.)
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the judiciary's formalist notions of contract and duress appeared overly
rigid, and failed to adequately reflect social reality.
The doctrine of judicial deference to legislative decision-making was
devised as a means to protect progressive social legislation from being
invalidated by the Lochner-era Supreme Court. A leading case enunciating this doctrine was Nebbia v. New York." 4 In Nebbia, the Supreme
court was faced with deciding the constitutionality of a minimum retail
price for milk set by a New York State agency. In upholding the statute,
the Court stated, "the guaranty of due process.., demands only that the
law selected shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that
the means selected have a real and substantial relationship to the object
to be sustained." 1' 15 Justice Roberts concluded that setting a floor for
milk prices was a satisfactory means of ensuring an adequate supply of
milk by preventing the destruction of the dairy industry through ruthless

competition. 116
By 1955, the degree of judicial scrutiny for economic and social legislation reached its present level in Williamson v. Lee Optical."7 The
Supreme Court justified the statute's differential treatment of opticians
and opthamologists by imputing a hypothetically rational means and end
to the statute. The Court surmised that the Oklahoma Legislature might
have concluded that prohibiting opticians from preparing new lenses
from old glasses without a prescription, despite convincing evidence that
the procedure was perfectly safe, promoted the general welfare. A rational justification for the law was said to be the encouragement of more
frequent eye examinations, which only opthamologists were qualified to
perform." 8 Legislation of this type need only be rationally related to
achieving a public goal. The Court concluded, "the day is gone when this
Court uses the Due Process Clause [to] strike down state laws [aid
regualtions] because they may be unwise, improvident or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought."" 9 In Suffolk Housing Services, the
Court of Appeals followed this general notion in its stated refusal to act
114. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
115. Id. at 525.
116. Id. at 530. See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co. 304 U.S. 144

(1938).
117.
118.
119.

348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Id. at 484.
Id. at 488.

884
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as a "regional planner" since zoning is "essentially a legislative task."' 20
B.

Public Values and the Presumption of Constitutionality

While the presumption of constitutionality was designed to prevent
a particular separation of powers conflict, the role of the judiciary is not
constitutionaly limited to assuring the existence of a minimum level of
rationality. The rationality standard, as applied in the equal protection
and due process clauses, is designed to prohibit what has been called a
"naked preference." '21 A naked preference is "the distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather than another solely on the
ground that those favored have exercised raw political power.' 22 The
prohibition against naked preferences endows the constitution with a
substantive mandate to prevent government from being the exclusive tool
of one faction or another.' 23 The framers of the constitution included
these prohibitions 124 in order to ensure that the political process would
produce public values,' 25 rather than simply emulate economic

markets. 126
This "public values" vision of the constitution unified by the
prohibitions against naked preferences is analytically distinct from the
127
dominant pluralist view of the theory and practice of judicial review.
The dominant view contains several major assumptions. First, the polit120.
672, 682
121.
122.
123.

Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 376 N.Y.S.2d
(1975).
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984).
Id. at 1689.
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (J. Madison). See also D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THE-

ORY OF THE FEDERALIST 5-7, 94-110 (1984); G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST

(1981).
124. Professor Sunstein argues that the equal protection, due process, dormant commerce, eminent domain and privileges and immunities clauses are embodiments of an original intent to avoid
the distibution of resources through the exertion of raw political power. See generally Sunstein, supra
note 122.
125. The civic republican tradition has been described as:
The notion that government must be responsive to something more than private pressure
is associated with the idea that politics is 'not the reconciling but the transcending of the
different interests of the society in the search for the single common good.' Civic Republicanism embodies a conception of politics in which preferences are not viewed as private
and exogenous. Their selection is the object of the government process. The model for
this conception of government is the town meeting, where decisions are made during a
process of collective self-determination.
Sunstein, supra note 121 at 1691.
126. Id. at 1693-94.
127. This theoro has found its most eloquent and influential form in J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) and J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIS-

TRUST (1980).
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ical process is normally able to assure access to all groups. Secondly, if
political access is systematically inhibited, as in race 128 and gender12 9 discrimination, courts are free to restore balance to the process through judicial intervention. The third major assumption of the dominant or
process-oriented conception is that judicial review is inherently less democratic than the political process. 13 0 The pluralist vision of politics is to
emulate economic markets by promoting the preferences of the majority
at the expense of the present minority within constitutional limits.
C.

The Insufficiency of Process-Oriented Theory

Recent scholarship has begun to undermine many of the empirical
and theoretical assumptions which support the judicial deference to legislative decision-making exemplified in Suffolk Housing Services. Richard
Parker,13 ' in criticizing the dominant "process orientation" of Jesse
Choper 3 2 and John Ely,133 summarized the basic tenets of their theory:
(1) In operation, our process of representative democracy normally
works well enough.
(a) Government decisionmakers, being responsible to the people at periodic
elections, are generally responsive to the interests of the majority.
(b) Majorities are not stable through time or across issues. They are shifting
coalitions formed in a process of basicallyfair and open competition among
"minority" interests.
(c) Because majorities are shifting, government decisionmakers cannot afford to completely ignore minority interests for fear that those interests
might be necessary to form a majority later. Thus, generally, they will take
all interests into fair account with respect to particular decisions.
(d) Individuals and groups generally can be counted on to recognize their
own interests through exercise of their voice and vote.
(2) This process, though, is subject to occasional, systemic
malfunctions.
(a) Acting in their own self-interest, those "in" power may try to restrict
the voice and vote of some of those who are "out" of power, thereby distorting the process of fair interest competition.
(b) In cases of majority prejudice against certain minorities, the process of
formation of shifting majority coalitions may be distorted. So, government
128.
129.
130.
(1971);
131.
132.
133.

See, eg., cases cited supra note 109.
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 110.
See, eg., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
Parker, The Past of ConstitutionalTheory-and Its Future, 42 OHmo ST. L. J. 223 (1980).
See CHOPER supra note 127.
See ELY supra note 127.
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decisionmakers may disregard the interests of such minorities.13 4
Choper and Ely maintain that the failures of the political process are
trivial in comparison to the radically undemocratic nature of an
unelected judiciary substituting its judgments for those of the legislature.
Parker responds to this concern by asserting that the process theorist's
preoccupation with the anomaly of judicial review prevents them from
divining the true nature of the political process.13 5 He also insists that
136
their stated standards for judging the political process are too loW.
Once invidious discrimination against a particular group is eliminated,
the process theorists assume that the group will be able to compete in the
"Madisonian" fray of interest group competition.
Parker notes social science findings that indicate that some groups
are simply unable to effectively voice their positions and assert themselves in the political process. 137 Furthermore, he adds that, "the bulk of
138
the citizens play no very significant part... in the political process."'
Parker's main point is that, after an objective look at the political process, it no longer appears fundamentally more democratic than judicial
review. Thus, Ely and Choper's aversion to the anomaly of judicial review is no longer justifiable.
This review of Parker's argument highlights the questionable foundation for some of the key premises of the presumption of constitutionality as applied in Suffolk Housing Services. The line of Supreme Court
cases from Nebbia to Lee Optical is typically described as a doctrinal and
theoretic advancement. 139 Advocates of this approach, reacting to the
stain of the Lochner-erajudiciary single-mindedly promoting its own social agenda, see judicial deference to legislative decision-making as the
only viable alternative. Judicial intervention is considereded a precious
form of capital to be held in reserve for the protection of fundamental
individual rights and racial discrimination. However, as Parker notes,
'process orientation' homogenizes a huge portion of our constitutional
rights and grants us a general right to a neutral reason when the government fails to serve our interests."" Examples of this homogenization are
134. Parker, supra note 131, at 240 (emphasis in original). See also Unger, The CriticalLegal
Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 602-16 (1983).
135. Parker,supra note 131 at 236.
136. Id. at 240.
137. Id. at 242.
138. Id. at 242-44.
139. P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 287-311
(2d. ed. 1983).
140. Parker, supra note 131 at 251.
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to be found in the differential treatment of opticians and opthamologists
in Lee Optical14 1 and the acceptance of general economic circumstances
as a rational reason for the lack of low-income housing in Suffolk Housing Services. The presumption of constitutionality creates a standard
which cannot possibly help to ensure that economic and social legislation
will be designed to promote public purposes. For groups not protected by
the heightened scrutiny of modem equal protection law, or for cases of
dispropotional racial impact, the professed neutral reason often appears
perplexing or seems to be the result of raw political power or callousness.
Under this regime, most Americans are treated as equally empowered,
cream-colored, ahistorical beings.42

IV.
A.

THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROPERTY AND
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Civic Republicanism: Property as the Basis for PoliticalAutonomy

Once the premises supporting the presumption of constitutionality
have been critically examined, its theoretical grounding becomes open to
question. The poor suffer many of the same systemic political disabilities
which presently justify the application of heightened scrutiny in the area
of racial discrimination. Yet when laws like the zoning ordinance in Suffolk Housing Services act to the acknowledged disavantage of the poor,
rationality review is applied. This section is devoted to the proposition
that the unique historical status of the poor warrants increased judicial
scrutiny of laws which unduly inhibit access to the housing market.
In the years between the Declaration of Independence and the ratification of the Constitution, all of the original states enacted tax-paying or
property qualifications for the franchise. 4 3 These qualifications were premised on the idea that the possession of property invested the individual
with an ability to exercise the independant judgment necessary to the
141. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The results in Lee Optical and CaroleneProducts can also be attributed to the exercise of raw political power on behalf of the opthamology and dairy industries respectively. These cases are normally cited to represent the good new days of modem rationality review
and economic due process.
142. Professor Freeman argues that modem equal protection law is a manifestation of what he
calls the "perpetrator perspective". "The perpetrator perspective sees racial discrimination not as
conditions, but as actions, inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator. The focus is more on what
particular perpetrators have done or are doing to some victim than it is on the overall life situation of
the victim class." From the victim's perspective, "racial discrimination describes those conditions of
actual social existence as a member of a perpetual underclass." Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-53 (1978).
143. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 168 (1969).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

process of self-governance. Conservatives and Whigs alike believed that
"propertylessness" made a man dependent on his social superiors. Any
such man would vote in the interest of his patron rather than the 'public
good'. As Gordon Wood related it:
If all men were independent and free of temptation, said James Iredell in an
expression of traditional eighteenth-century Whig opinion, then everyone
could have "an independent vote for a representative." But because they are
not, "there must be some restriction as to the right of voting: otherwise the
lowest and most ignorant of mankind must associate in this important business with those it is presumed from their property and other circumstances,
are free from influence and have some knowledge of the great consequence
of their trust." Even the most radical English Whigs, like James Burgh and
Joseph Priestly, feared the "people in low circumstances" who were especially susceptible "to bribery, or under the power of their superiors"
....
144
[sic] [O]thers expressed more mundane reasons for their fears.
Strange as this sentiment may sound to the reader, the quotation
contains a strong concern for a rough equality between members of the
polity. 145 It ackowledges that great disparities in wealth will inhibit the
political process in its pursuit of "public values." With the notion of formal equality embedded in the modern mind, equality is associated with
"voice and vote." This is the result of a historical process which occurred
in the 19th century.14 6 The initial attempt to reconcile the Revolutionary
War credo of egalitarianism and the older notion of property-as-autonomy found form in Jefferson's ideal of the yeoman farmer and southern
144. Id. Blackstone, commenting on suffrage requirements, stated:
The true reason of requiring any qualification, with regard to property, in voters, is to
exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will

of their own. If these persons had votes, they would be tempted to dispose of them under
some undue influence or other. This would give a great, an artful, or a wealthy man, a
larger share in elections than is consistent with general liberty. If it were probable that
every man would give his vote freely, and without influence of any kind, then, upon the
true theory and genuine principles of liberty, every member of the community, however
poor, should have a vote in electing those delegates, to his liberty, and his life. But, since
that can hardly be expected in persons of indigent fortune, or such as are under the
immediate dominion of others, all popular states have been obliged to establish certain
qualifications; whereby some, who are suspected to have no will of their own, are excluded from voting, in order to set other individuals, whose wills may be supposed independent, more thoroughly upon a level with each other.
W. BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *171 (1765).

145. See, e.g., POCOCK, Civic Humanism and its Role in Anglo-American Thought, in POLITICS,
LANGUAGE, AND TIME (1971).

146. See generally Steinfeld, Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335
(1989) (asserting that in the mid-19th century line between the political franchise and disenfranchisement was drawn at the ability to alienate ones labor).
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agrarianism.1 47 In this way, anyone desiring the independence which
land conferred could come to possess it. This represented the simple solution-made possible by an abundant supply of unsettled land (or more
accurately, land occupied only by Native Americans). Unfortunately for
Jefferson and the yeoman farmer, America was to be a commercial, manufacturing nation.
B.

The Idea of FormalPoliticalEquality: Labor as Property

The civic republican notion that property/independence was a prerequisite for political participation was confronted with a major theoretical problem in the early 19th century in the form of artisans' and
laborers' demands for universal white male suffrage.14 While in the end
the suffragists were successful, their opponents were quick to point out
the contradiction inherent in their position. "There is nothing in the condition of our country to prevent [workers] from being absolutely dependent on their employers, here as everywhere else. The whole body of
every manufacturing establishment, therefore dead votes, counted on by
head, by their employer." 14 9 Although the northern factory worker could
be considered as dependent on his employer as the slave was to his
master, the laborer could no longer complain that his material condition
prevented full-scale political participation.
This contradiction forced the development of a new theory of labor,
property and the individual. Drawing on Locke's Second Treatise, a
man's labor was conceptualized as his property or capital. Employment
shifted from a mixed public-private relationship dominated by the statute
of laborers and master and servant law, to a purely private contractual
relationship. Dependence came to be defined as the inability to alienate
one's own labor. Men now "owned" their labor in the same way that the
the yeoman owned the farm, and the factory owner owned the factory.
"Property ownership.., was being propelled into the realm of the 'private'. It might confer independence and it might give power, but it was
only a matter of private relations between individuals in civil society." 15 0
The privatization of labor assisted in harmonizing this theoretical
contradiction.
147. L. WHARTON, CONFLICTING THEORIES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE NEW NATION
49-50 (1979).
148. See generally W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 86-118
(1972).
149. MINUTES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1823, at 251-52
(1853).
150. Steinfeld, supra note 146 at 367.
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Just as the founders of the United States perceived the critical relationship between wealth and political participation, modem theorists too
must make this connection. While the concerns of 18th century theorists
were dependence and autonomy, today's issues are the unequal distribution of political power and its abuses. The privatization of labor and the
present emphasis on formal equality mask the fundamental reality of social relations. Those individuals and groups who lack property are simply
unable to advance their views in the age of mass media politics. Thus the
poor can be faulted for their lack of political acumen while being reminded of their equality. The legacy of civic republicanism serves to remind us of how socio-economic relations were an important
consideration in early political theory and perhaps should be again.
C.

The Pluralist Understandingof Equality

While Jefferson and others were conceptualizing a political life centered around the individual freeholders, James Madison, in writing the
Federalist Papers, developed a political theory which emphasized groups
or "factions," as he called them. Madison's concern with protecting the
political process from the tyranny of a present majority is a lineal ancestor of Ely and Choper's process-oriented theory. 15 Group theories of
politics tend to more accurately portray the world which we inhabit.
Political parties, PACs and interest groups dominate today's political
scene. 152 The individual is almost powerless outside of this framework.
While the "Madisonian" conception of democracy provides a superior
analytic tool, it fails to take into account the substantive lessons of civic
republicanism-that political actors require some sort of rough equality
of material circumstance in order to participate in defining the public

good. 153
An important failure of modem pluralism is its inability to recognize that many groups unprotected by heightened scrutiny are systematically disadvantaged in the political process. The low-income population
of Brookhaven, as well as those individuals who do not currently live
there but would like to, are such a group. They cannot promote their
political needs as well as middle-class homeowners . The failure to pre151. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (J. Madison).
152. For a discussion of the nature and importance of Political Action Committees (PACs), see
G. ADAMS, THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING: THE IRON TRIANGLE 110-124 (1981); M.
GREEN, WHO RUNS CONGRESS? 6-10 (1975); Budde, The Practical Role of PAC's in the Political
Process, 22 ARIz. L. REV. 555 (1980).
153. M. WEBER, supra note 112 at 152-53.
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map any land for multi-family housing and its attendant disincentive to
development can be considered a naked preference-an exercise of the
raw political power by the upper and middle classes against the low-income minority.
As R.A. Dahl, the former prophet of pluralist theory, said recently:
Ownership and control contribute to the creation of great differences
among citizens in wealth, income, status, skills, information, control over
information and propaganda, access to political leaders, and, on the average, predictable life chances, not only for mature adults but also for the
unborn, infants, and children. After all due qualifications have been made,
differences like these help in turn to generate significant inequalities among
citizens in their capacities and
154opportunities for participating as political
equals in governing the state.
The influence of PACs and wholesale influence-peddling "corrodes the
fundamental compromise of capitalist political democracy, according to
which the unequal influence of the economic realm is supposed to oper'1 5
ate in a sphere separate from the equal influence of the polity.
Wealthy business interests "invest" in the part of the political spectrum
which will further their pecuniary interests.
D. The Modern Era: Wealth and PoliticalPower
Though the purpose of this article is not to explore the relationship
between campaign finance and democracy, the unequal distribution,
largely along the epiphenomenona of class and race, of functional access
to the political process should be noted.56 Dahl, in his earlier work, assumed that political participation was a function of interest. Those who
have an interest in, or "feel strongly" about, a particular issue will participate more fully, thereby ensuring that their interests are heard. Those
who fail to assert themselves are assumed to be "neutral" or disinterested. This dynamic further assumes that all interests will be served by
the individuals most interested in a particular issue prevailing on any
given issue. 157 In reality, those who are poor, uneducated, young, female
or black are disproportionately under-represented in all measures of
political participation. In terms of influence, these groups are unable to
make the large campaign contributions neccessary for effective representation. An interesting corrollary of these facts is that the political agen154.

R. A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 55 (1985).

155.

R. KUTTNER, THE LIFE OF THE PARTY 34 (1987).

156. As was noted earlier, race discrimination law is concerned with functional, rather than
formal, access to the political system.
157.

See generally R.A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
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das of non-participants are likely to be significantly different from
participants.
Policy makers probably know that the policy preferences of lower-status nonparticipating persons are different from those of higher-status participating persons. For one thing, most policy makers themselves are upperstatus participants. Most of them probably share the value preferences of
other upper-status participating citizens. And it should come as no surprise
if they believe that those preferences should be reflected in public policy.
Nor should it come as a surprise if policy makers are reluctant to bring
public policy in line with the policy preferences of lower-status nonparticipating citizens. 158
If one accepts the idea that the prohibition against naked transfers
embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses stands for the
proposition that the judiciary is constitutionally mandated to take an active role in assuring that legislation be directed at a public value, the issue
of the judiciary's role becomes one of degree. As presently constituted,
rationality review allows the town of Brookhaven to justify an acknowledged policy of inhibiting low-income housing based on general economic circumstances. This standard of review is so weak that it prevents
courts from ever determining whether a legitimate public value was considered by the legislature. According to this model, the appellant's remaining option is to seek redress with the local legislature. However,
poor people as a group are unlikely to participate in any measurable
forms of political activity. 5 9 This deficiency is reinforced by a self-image
of ineffectiveness. 6 Lack of education, inability to speak in public, low
16 t
levels of capital, and inadequate access to information and propaganda
create recognized impediments to voicing concerns over issues like lowincome housing.
E.

Why Closer Scrutiny is Necessary

In Suffolk Housing Services, the town of Brookhaven engaged in a
market manipulation which inhibited the development of low-income
housing by squeezing an already tight market. Though the idea of judicial intervention in this case may appear superficially similar to the plaintiff's claim in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,162 there are
158. G. HENDERSON, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 87 (1985). For an analysis of recent voting
trends which supports this observation, see R. KuTTrNER, supra note 156 at 109-150.
159. G. HENDERSON, supra note 158 at 89.
160. J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 233-46 (1980).
161.
162.

D. HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 201 (1987).
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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significant enough differences between the cases to warrant distinct analyses. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court was faced with a claim for direct
redistribution of education resources. Plaintiffs demanded that the state
equalize per capita educational expenses across Texas.
In Suffolk Housing Services, the appellants claim can be construed
as a request that the town be prevented from manipulating the market to
discourage development. Implicit in Rodriguez is a belief that the market-as-politics will decide issues such as school expenditures. If this market orientation is taken seriously, 163 there is little sense in allowing a
municipality to interfere with the private development of housing, especially when the intent is to exclude. While Rodriguez concerns the redistribution of existing resources, the application of heightened scrutiny in
Suffolk HousingServices is analogous to an antitrust action to assure that
the housing market is not unfairly manipulated. If the original justification for zoning-that every use should have its place according to a comprehensive planl'4--has any meaning, there appears to be little reason to
single out and discourage multi-family/low-income housing.
Cases like Suffolk Housing Services should be subjected to closer judicial scrutiny for several reasons. First, as this comment has argued, a
major premise of the presumption of constitutionality/rationality review
is that each individual or group has a formally equal opportunity to
choose members of the legislature and petition it for redress. Even a cursory look at the American political system highlights the stiff formalism
of this premise. There is a severe disjunction between the theory of formal equality and the reality of the functional socio-ecnomic inequality.
This uneasy co-existence is historically susceptible to judicial recognition.
Coppage v. Kansas 6 and Adair v. United States16 6 are illustrative.
In these cases, the Supreme Court struck down statutes which prohibited
workers from signing promises not to join unions ("yellow dog contracts") in order to work under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. These cases have two primary meanings. First, they represent the evil of the long-gone Lochner-era. Secondly, the cases demonstrate the overwhelming power of the classical legal conceptual scheme.
In these cases, the Supreme Court applied a highly formalistic notion of
163.
164.
U.S. 365
165.
166.

The market may not be an appropriate model for the provision of housing.
S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 143-71 (1969); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
(1926).
236 U.S. 1 (1915).
208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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contract. 67 In Adair, despite the Court's failure to deny the inequality of
bargaining power of labor and capital, the statute was held to violate the
implied constitutional right of freedom of contract.
The Court refused to accept that argument, not because it denied the obvious inequality.. ., but because freedom of contract had to be defined objectively ... without regard to the equities of the particular situation.... Since
the common law had excluded economic pressure from its definition of duress as a legal excuse for nonperformance of contracts, then by definition
yellow dog contracts were not formed under duress and were therefore
freely entered. 168
In Suffolk Housing Services, the Court of Appeals is engaged in the

same sort of objective boundary definition in terms of wealth, judicial
review, and the political process. To constitutionally deny legislative rec-

ognition of inequality of bargaining power is now unthinkable. Yet society continues to ignore the influence of wealth on political power and the
allocation of resources.
The second reason for applying closer judicial scrutiny to the implementation of zoning ordinances is its essential dissimilarity to other legislative acts."69 A doctrinal shift away from presuming the
constitutionality of zoning laws first gained judicial recognition in Fasano
v. Board of Zoning Examiners.17 There, the issue was the degree of judicial scrutiny to be afforded a spot zoning amendment. The Supreme
Court of Oregon held that the quasi-judicial nature of the "legislative"

decision to approve the proposed change placed the burden on the developer to prove that the amendment should be granted.

71

The decision is

an unequivocal recognition that zoning amendments do not result from
the same deliberative process as bona fide legislative decisions.
Ironically, except perhaps for exclusion, land use planning is done
on a largely ad hoc basis. The maintenance of property values, the preser167.

Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 18 (D.

Kaiyrs ed. 1982).
168. Id. at 25-26.
169.

Linbolm, The Science of Muddling Through, in A READER INPLANNING THEORY 151 (A.

Faludi ed. 1973).
170. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). In Fasano, The Supreme Court of Oregon held that in
approving any zoning amendment, the local government must prove "that the change is in conformance with the comprehensive plan." Id. at 583-84, 507 P.2d at 28.
While Fasano was concerned with justifying changes in the staus quo, the idea that the zoning
amendment process is quasi-administrative or judicial, rather than legislative, is still important in the
context of this comment. Id. at 581, 507 P.2d at 30. This standard of review could also be used to
force zoning officials to justify failure to alter the status quo, if the failure appears to contradict the
mandate of the comprehensive plan.
171. Id. at 581, 507 P.2d at 30.

1988/89]

EXCL USIONAR Y ZONING

vation of the tax base, and the notion that a municipality has a sacred
right to maintain its present character and exclusivity have overwhelmed
the original justifications for zoning." 2 If society is committed to assuring that legislation has public value, zoning is a substantive area which
cries out for closer judicial scrutiny. The idea that zoning is administered
according to any comprehensive plan is honored primarily in its breach.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF STATUTES WHICH
UNDULY DISADVANTAGE LOW-INCOME PERSONS'ACCESS
TO THE HOUSING MARKET

A.

Reversing the Presumption?

In 1982, the Reagan Administration announced its intent to support
a reversal of the presumption of constitutionality of zoning ordinances. '" 3 The Presidential Commission on Housing proposed that a
zoning ordinance which denies development will be found to be valid
only if it is nesessary "to achieve a vital and pressing governmental
need."1 7 4 The proposal would afford developers the same degree of judicial scrutiny that victims of intentional racial discrimination now receive.
Presently, a developer has recourse to takings law and state court review
1 75
to protect herself.
This proposal is not justified. The Presidential Commission's approach must be rejected for three reasons. First, it over-emphasizes
growth. By eliminating all restrictions controlling the quantity and quality of growth, communities would lose their ability to prevent the
'McDonaldfication' of their communities. If a proposed development is
subject to the "necessary to achieve a vital and pressing governmental
need" standard suggested by the Commission, communities will lose
their ability to control or limit commercial strip development, shopping
malls and the like. While this comment has been critical of local land use
planning, it does not reject the concept. When the general welfare goals
of the police power account equally for all racial and socio-economic
groups, land use planning can become a mechanism for reflecting community value formation.
Secondly, developers would become empowered beyond what his172. Delogu, supra note 104 at 286.
173. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING (1982).
174. Id. at 200.
175. Mandelker, Reversing the Presumption of Constitutionality,30 WASH. U.J. URB. & CON-

TEMP. L. 5, 15 (1986).
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tory warrants. In Korematsu v. United States,'7 6 the Supreme Court announced that laws which discriminate on the basis of race "must be
subjected to the most rigid scritiny,"'" and that only a compelling gov-

ernmental purpose could legitimate such laws. No such compelling reason to promote development exists. Furthermore, the School Desegration
Cases and Craig v. Boren reflect an understanding that only historically
invidious discrimination can justify a reversal of the presumption of constitutionality. Affording this same degree of judicial protection to developers would be a gratuitous insult to those of oppressed backgrounds.
Land developers simply have no history of invidious discrimination.
Thirdly, advocates of deregulation have little or no interest in lowincome housing. 7 ' Rather, the focus is on abuses in the zoning process.
These abuses include raising the price of housing by requiring large
house and lot size, thereby excluding even the middle class from certain
areas. 79 The deregulators view low-income housing as the exclusive
province of government.
As this comment has argued, the unique historical and theoretical
position of the poor in our society makes closer judicial scrutiny necessary when they are disadvantaged by a statute which unfairly manipualtes a market, such as housing. The purpose of heightened scrutiny of
legislation of this type is not to give a special advantage; it merely ensures
that the legislation which disadvantages the poor in the housing market
is enacted and implemented to carry out a public purpose. The essentially
non-legislative nature of zoning amendments provides an especially attractive mileau for closer scrutiny when land use decisions of this kind
are at issue.
B.

"SubstantiallyRelated to Important Government Purposes"

In analyzing any piece of legislation, it is necessary to ask several
questions. First, does the staute pursue a permissable end? Secondly, are
the means used to achieve a permissible end constitutional? An additional question might be: are there less drastic means available to achieve
176. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
177. Id. at 216. This is not to say that the case was correctly decided. Among other deficiencies,
Korematsu presents a very weak means-ends nexxus as a justification for the internment of all west
coast Japanese-Americans.
178. Mallach, The Fallacy of Laissez Faire;Land Use Deregulation,Housing Affordability and
the Poor, 30 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 35, 36 (1986).
179. Id. at 38.

1988/89]

EXCLUSIONARY ZONING

the desired end?18 ° If society is committed to giving its legislation public
value, these questions must be rigorously applied. The state's weak burden of proof prevents a claim like Suffolk Housing Services from succeeding in all but the most egregious instances. This comment proposes
that in suits where the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case tending to
prove that a land use policy leads to a significant reduction or moratorium in the construction of low-income housing, the presumption of constitutionality should be eliminated. Instead, the state should be forced to
prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the statute's means-end
nexus is not unduly burdensome to the poor. The standard would be
similar to the one enunciated in Craig v. Boren.'8 1 There, the Court held
that a statute which created distinct gender categories had to be "substantially related to important governmental purposes." The Supreme
Court rejected Oklahoma's position that prohibiting the sale of beer to
men, but not women, under the age of 21 was necessary to prevent drunk
driving accidents. In support of its position, Oklahoma asserted that
males in this group were much more likely to be involved in alcoholrelated mishaps than were women.
By utilizing a prima-facie case, preponderance of evidence standard,
the law would recognize the twin goals of ensuring that the poor are not
unduly burdened by land use laws and maintaining flexibility in local
land use policy. By contrast, a reversal of the presumption would prevent
the implemetation of land use policies which had any negative impact on
the poor. Noting the pervasive influence of zoning regulation on the
housing market, such a reversal would not be warranted. An intermediate level of scrutiny would force local governments to fully consider the
implications of their policies and help bring about less drastic means to
180.

See Note, State Economic Substantive Due Process: A ProposedApproach, 88 YALE L.J.

1487 (1979).
181.

429 U.S. 190 (1976). As Justice Stevens noted in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (Stevens, J. concurring), the multi-tiered analysis of modem equal protection law may not be the most logical approach. Instead, "the rational basis test ... adequately
explains why a law that deprives a person of the right to vote because his skin has a different pigmentation ... violates the equal protection clause.... We do not need to apply strict scrutiny or even
heightened scrutiny to decide such cases." Id. at 452-53.
In Cleburne, the majority invalidated a zoning ordinance that required a group home for the
mentally retarded, but not similar uses, such as fraternity houses, nursing homes, and dormitories, to
seek a special permit in order to develop. Despite refusing to apply strict scrutiny, the court found
the distinction to be arbitrary under a rationally related analysis. 473 U.S. 432.
With Justice Stevens's comments in mind, the suggestion that courts follow the approach outlined
in Craig v. Boren is not meant to be overly rigid. The Town of Brookhaven's zoning policy, this
comment argues, could also be invalidated under the rationality analysis put forth by Justice Stevens.
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achieve permissible goals without stripping them of the power to inhibit
development.
Analyzing the implementation of the town of Brookhaven's multifamily housing policy will put the above proposal into perspective. First,
it is necessary to look at the purpose of the legislation. If its goal is to
control the level of growth and assure that multi-family development is
close to necessary infra-structure requirements such as arterial roads,
public transportation, and shopping these are surely permissible legislative goals. Having concluded that the suggested ends are appropriate, the
means of achieving the ends must be considered. Rather than pre-mapping land to further its goals, the town of Brookhaven utilized the zoning
amendment process and its attendant costs, risks, and inevitable public
disapproval. These procedures were, according to the Appellate Division,
"at least a contributing factor" in the lack of low-cost housing. Assuming
that the plaintiff proved this deficiency by a preponderance of evidence,
the jury or judge would find that the town failed to promote its end
through less restrictive means such as specifically pre-mapping land for
specific multi-family housing.
This approach serves the goals mentioned earlier, as well as maintaining stability by informing other property owners where such housing
would be located. Admittedly, other fact situations might present a more
difficult case for the trier of fact. The preponderance standard ensures
that where great doubt exists as to the legality of the municipality's
means-ends nexus, the case will be resolved in favor of the government.
This standard only ensures that the poor are not the victims of brushback pitches in the game of pluralist hardball.
The prima-facie case/preponderance of evidence standard will help
to reconcile the prevailing theory of judicial review with the way in
which the poor socially and economically experience zoning. The prohibition of naked preferences and our civic republican heritage suggest that
an important task of modem constitutional law is to prevent groups such
as the poor from being unnecessarily handicapped within current market
ideology. Perhaps, this goal can be furthered by adopting the model of
judicial review suggested in these pages.
PETER M. CARTER

